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Abstract 
The conventional search and matching model has been criticized for its inability to explain large 
cyclical volatility in the vacancy-unemployment ratio without ad hoc assumptions of wage 
rigidity. This paper presents a mechanism of such volatility without assuming wage rigidity by 
showing that households can rationally select a Nash equilibrium consisting of strategies of 
choosing a Pareto inefficient transition path. This type of path is generated after a time 
preference shock and causes a persistently large amount of extra unutilized resources. The labor 
market is thereby distorted and becomes more cyclically volatile. Vacancy costs are particularly 
affected by this Nash equilibrium. Because this Pareto inefficient path proceeds “rigidly,” that is, 
the Pareto inefficiency diminishes gradually, an ingredient of rigidity is introduced into the 
economy, and the vacancy-unemployment ratio experiences large cyclical fluctuations. 
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1  INTRODUCTION 
 
The conventional search and matching model (e.g., Pissarides, 1985; Mortensen and Pissarides, 
1994) has been criticized by Shimer (2004, 2005) and Hall (2005a) for not having the power to 
generate sufficiently large cyclical volatility in the vacancy-unemployment (v-u) ratio. Shimer 
(2004, 2005), Farmer and Hollenhorst (2005), Hall (2005a), Hall and Milgrom (2008), Gertler 
and Trigari (2009), and Kennan (2010) suggested the necessity of modifying the mechanism of 
wage formation in conventional models, for example, by introducing wage rigidity, to solve this 
shortcoming because the wage-setting mechanism in these models (i.e., the Nash bargaining 
solution) has increasingly been regarded as unsatisfactory (see also Hornstein et al., 2005; 
Yashiv, 2007). 
 Introducing wage rigidity into these models may solve the problem with cyclical 
volatility, but a consensus on the validity of wage rigidity has not necessarily been reached even 
though wage rigidity, or more broadly price rigidity, has long been studied. Price rigidity has 
been criticized for its fragile theoretical (micro-) foundation and its inability to explain the 
persistent nature of inflation. Mankiw (2001) argued that the so-called new Keynesian Phillips 
curve is ultimately a failure and is not consistent with the standard stylized facts about the 
dynamic effects of monetary policy (see also, e.g., Fuhrer and Moore, 1995; Galí and Gertler, 
1999). 
 The purpose of this paper is to offer an alternative approach to the problem associated 
with the conventional search and matching model. The focus is not on frictions that may exist 
on the shock transmission path (e.g., wage rigidity) but instead on the structure of the 
transmission path itself. If the transmission path is not a simple straight conduit but rather a 
more complicated conductor, rigidity-like phenomena may be observed. The remedy of 
introducing price rigidity has been used to explain observed phenomena that look like persistent 
deviations from Pareto efficiency. Rational agents will usually not allow Pareto inefficiency to 
remain for a long period, and it will disappear soon after it is generated. However, an exception 
is possible because a Nash equilibrium can conceptually coexist with Pareto inefficiency. If a 
Nash equilibrium that consists of strategies that generate Pareto inefficient payoffs is rationally 
selected, rigidity-like phenomena may be observed. 
 This paper shows that a Nash equilibrium consisting of strategies of choosing a Pareto 
inefficient transition path of consumption to the steady state (hereafter called a “Nash 
equilibrium of a Pareto inefficient path”) is generated even in a frictionless economy if—and 
probably only if—the rate of time preference shifts. An essential reason for the generation of 
this path is that households are intrinsically risk averse and not cooperative. In a strategic 
environment, this generates the possibility that, if consumption needs to be substantially and 
discontinuously increased to keep Pareto optimality, a non-cooperative household’s strategy to 
deviate from the Pareto optimal path gives a higher expected utility than the strategy of 
choosing the Pareto optimal path.   
 The Nash equilibrium of a Pareto inefficient path should not be confused with a Pareto 
inferior Nash equilibrium or a Nash equilibrium that is Pareto inefficient. They are conceptually 
quite different, although the Nash equilibrium of a Pareto inefficient path discussed in this paper 
is also a Pareto inferior Nash equilibrium and a Nash equilibrium that is Pareto inefficient. 
Multiple equilibria due to, for example, increasing returns, an externality or a complementarity 
in a macro-economic framework are usually Pareto ranked equilibria and include a Pareto 
inferior equilibrium (e.g., Morris and Shin, 2001). Such a Pareto inferior equilibrium usually 
indicates lower production and consumption than Pareto superior equilibria, suggesting a 
recession. However, if consumption is immediately adjusted completely when the economy is 
switched from a Pareto superior equilibrium to the inferior one, unutilized resources will not be 
generated as a result of the switch; therefore, merely showing the possibility of multiple Pareto 
ranked equilibria is not sufficient to explain the generation mechanism of persistent Pareto 
inefficiency. A mechanism that generates huge and persistent unutilized resources during the 
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transition path to the new equilibrium should be also presented, and the Nash equilibrium of a 
Pareto inefficient path fully explains this mechanism. 
 If households are cooperative, they will always proceed on Pareto efficient paths 
because they will coordinate with each other to perfectly utilize all resources. Conversely, if 
they do not coordinate with each other, they may strategically not utilize all resources; that is, 
they may select a Nash equilibrium of a Pareto inefficient path. Such a possibility cannot be 
denied a priori, because a Nash equilibrium can coexist with Pareto inefficiency. In fact, 
households are intrinsically not cooperative—they act independently of one another. Suppose 
that an upward shift of the time preference rate occurs. All households will be knocked off the 
Pareto efficient path on which they have proceeded until the shift occurred. At that moment, 
each household must decide on a direction in which to proceed. Because they are no longer on a 
Pareto efficient path, households choose a path strategically on the basis of the expected utility 
calculated considering other households’ choices; that is, each household behaves 
non-cooperatively in its own interest considering other households’ strategies. This situation can 
be described by a non-cooperative mixed strategy game. In this paper, I show that there is a 
Nash equilibrium of a Pareto inefficient path in this game. 
 A weaknesses of the dynamic stochastic general equilibrium approach to 
macroeconomics stems from going too directly from statements about individuals to statements 
about the aggregate (Caballero, 2010). The Nash equilibrium of a Pareto inefficient path is an 
answer to this problem because this equilibrium is not derived from a simple summation of 
individuals’ identical behaviors but is a result of strategic interactions among non-cooperative 
individuals. 
 Time preference is the source of shock in this mechanism. The rate of time preference 
has been naturally supposed and actually observed to be time-variable since the era of 
Böhm-Bawerk (1889) and Fisher (1930). This paper presents an endogenous time preference 
model, in which the rate of time preference is inversely proportionate to the expected 
steady-state consumption. Hence, the model is consistent with many observations that the rate 
of time preference is negatively correlated with permanent income (e.g., Lawrance, 1991) and 
thus escapes from the drawback of Uzawa’s (1968) well-known endogenous time preference 
model. The model in this paper indicates that a shock to the expected steady-state consumption 
changes the rate of time preference.  
 A Nash equilibrium consisting of strategies of choosing a Pareto inefficient transition 
path introduces an ingredient of rigidity into various phenomena in the economy because this 
Pareto inefficient path proceeds “rigidly,” that is, the Pareto inefficiency diminishes gradually, 
and the labor market is not an exception. The paper shows that this Nash equilibrium affects 
various parameters used in the conventional search and matching model and distorts the 
matching process. The separation rate rises, job-finding rate falls, vacancy costs increase, and 
labor productivity decreases. Vacancy costs are particularly important, which is intuitively and 
logically reasonable because firms should reduce the number of vacancies as the cost of 
vacancies increase and vice versa. Because Pareto inefficiency on this path persists, an 
ingredient of rigidity is introduced into the economy, and the v-u ratio experiences large cyclical 
fluctuations. 
 The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 shows that a Nash equilibrium of a Pareto 
inefficient path is rationally generated when the time preference rates of risk-averse and 
non-cooperative households shift. In addition, an endogenous time preference model is 
constructed, in which the rate of time preference is inversely proportionate to steady-state 
consumption. In Section 3, the Nash equilibrium of a Pareto inefficient path is incorporated into 
a conventional search and matching model. In Section 4, I argue that the explanation for 
economic fluctuations based on time preference shocks has many advantages over other 
explanations from various points of view. Finally, I offer concluding remarks in Section 5. 
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2  THE NASH EQUILIBRIUM OF A PARETO 
INEFFICIENT PATH 
 
2.1  Model with non-cooperative households 1 
2.1.1  The shock 
The model describes the utility maximization of households after an upward time preference 
shock. This shock was chosen because it is one of the few shocks that result in a Nash 
equilibrium of a Pareto inefficient path (other possible shocks are discussed in Section 2.5). 
Another important reason for selecting an upward time preference shock is that it shifts the 
steady state to lower production and consumption than before the shock, which is consistent 
with the phenomena actually observed in a recession.  
  Although the rate of time preference is a deep parameter, it has not been regarded as a 
source of shocks for economic fluctuations, possibly because the rate of time preference is 
thought to be constant and not to shift suddenly. There is also a practical reason, however. 
Models with a permanently constant rate of time preference exhibit excellent tractability (see 
Samuelson, 1937). However, the rate of time preference has been naturally assumed and 
actually observed to be time-variable. The concept of a time-varying rate of time preference has 
a long history (e.g., Böhm-Bawerk, 1889; Fisher, 1930). More recently, Lawrance (1991) and 
Becker and Mulligan (1997) showed that people do not inherit permanently constant rates of 
time preference by nature and that economic and social factors affect the formation of time 
preference rates. Their arguments indicate that many incidents can affect and change the rate of 
time preference throughout life. For example, Parkin (1988) examined business cycles in the 
United States, explicitly considering the time-variability of time preference rate, and showed 
that the rate of time preference was as volatile as technology and leisure preference. Because 
time preference is naturally time-variable, models of endogenous time preference have been 
presented, the most familiar of which is Uzawa’s (1968) model. In Section 2.6, the endogeneity 
of time preference is examined in detail and an endogenous time preference model is presented 
as the mechanism of generation of the shock. 
 
2.1.2  Households 
Households are not intrinsically cooperative. Except in a strict communist economy, households 
do not coordinate themselves to behave as a single entity when consuming goods and services. 
The model in this paper assumes non-cooperative, identical and infinitely living households and 
that the number of households is sufficiently large. Each of them equally maximizes the 
expected utility 
 
   dtcuθtE t  00 exp  ,                         (1) 
 
subject to 
 
    ttt ckAfdt
dk  ,  ,                           (2) 
 
where yt, ct, and kt are production, consumption, and capital per capita in period t respectively; A 
is technology and constant; u is the utility function;  tt kAfy ,  is the production 
function;   >θ 0 is the rate of time preference; and E0 is the expectations operator conditioned 
on agents’ period 0 information set. yt, ct, and kt are monotonously continuous and differentiable 
                                                  
1 The model in Section 2 is based on the model by Harashima (2009). See also Harashima (2004a, 2004b). 
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in t, and u and f are monotonously continuous functions of ct and kt, respectively. All households 
initially have an identical amount of financial assets equal to kt, and all households gain the 
identical amount of income  tt kAfy ,  in each period. It is assumed that   0
t
t
dc
cdu  and 
  02
2

t
t
dc
cud ; thus, households are risk averse. For simplicity, the utility function is specified to 
be the constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility function  
 
                              γ
ccu
γ
t
t 

1
1
   if 1γ  
                               tt ccu ln    if 1γ  , 
 
where  γ0 . In addition,   0, 

t
t
k
kAf  and   02
2


t
t
k
kf . Technology A and labor 
supply are assumed to be constant. 
 The effects of an upward shift in time preference are shown in Figure 1. Suppose first 
that the economy is at steady state before the shock. After the upward time preference shock, the 
vertical line 0
dt
dct  moves to the left (from the solid line to the dashed line in Fig 1). To keep 
Pareto efficiency, consumption needs to jump immediately from the steady state before the 
shock (the prior steady state) to point Z. After the jump, consumption proceeds on the Pareto 
efficient saddle path after the shock (the posterior Pareto efficient saddle path) from point Z to 
the lower steady state after the shock (the posterior steady state). Nevertheless, this 
discontinuous jump to Z may be uncomfortable for risk-averse households that wish to smooth 
consumption and not to experience substantial fluctuations. Households may instead take a 
shortcut and, for example, proceed on a path on which consumption is reduced continuously 
from the prior steady state to the posterior steady state (the bold dashed line in Fig. 1), but this 
shortcut is not Pareto efficient. 
  Choosing a Pareto inefficient consumption path must be consistent with each 
household’s maximization of its expected utility. To examine the possibility of the rational 
choice of a Pareto inefficient path, the expected utilities between the two options need be 
compared. For this comparison, I assume that there are two options for each non-cooperative 
household with regard to consumption just after an upward time preference shift. The first is a 
jump option “J”, in which a household’s consumption jumps to Z and then proceeds on the 
posterior Pareto efficient saddle path to the posterior steady state. The second is a non-jump 
option “NJ”, in which a household’s consumption does not jump but instead gradually 
decreases from the prior steady state to the posterior steady state, as shown by the bold dashed 
line in Figure 1. The household that chose the NJ option reaches the posterior steady state in 
period  0s . The difference in consumption between the two options in each period t is bt (≥ 
0). Thus, b0 indicates the difference between Z and the prior steady state. bt diminishes 
continuously and becomes zero in period s. The NJ path of consumption (ct) after the shock is 
monotonously continuous and differentiable in t and 0
dt
dct  if st 0 . In addition,  
 
                             tt ccc ˆ    if st 0  
                             cct        if ts 0  ,  
 
where tcˆ  is consumption when proceeding on the posterior Pareto efficient saddle path and c  
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is consumption in the posterior steady state. Therefore, 
 
                          0ˆ  ttt ccb    if st 0  
                          0tb             if ts 0  . 
 
  It is also assumed that, when a household chooses the option that is different from the 
option the other households choose, the difference in the accumulation of financial assets 
resulting from the difference in consumption (bt) before period s between the household and the 
other households is reflected in consumption after period s. That is, the difference in the return 
on financial assets is added to (or subtracted from) the household’s consumption in each period 
after period s. The exact functional form of the addition (or subtraction) is shown in Section 
2.1.4. 
 
2.1.3  Firms 
Unutilized products (bt) are eliminated quickly in each period by firms, because holding bt for a 
long period is a cost to firms. Elimination of bt is done by discarding the goods or preemptively 
suspending production, leaving some capital and labor inputs idle. However, in the next period, 
unutilized products are generated again because the economy is not proceeding on the Pareto 
efficient saddle path. Unutilized products are therefore successively generated and eliminated. 
Faced with these unutilized products, firms dispose of the excess capital that generates bt. 
Disposing of the excess capital is rational for firms, because the excess capital is an unnecessary 
cost for firms, but this means that parts of the firms are liquidated, which takes time and thus 
disposing of the excess capital will also take time. If the economy proceeds on the NJ path (that 
is, if all households choose the NJ option), firms dispose all of the remaining excess capital that 
generates bt and adjust their capital to the posterior steady-state level in period s, corresponding 
to households’ reaching the posterior steady state. Thus, if the economy proceeds on the NJ 
path, capital kt is 
 
                            tt kkk ˆ    if st 0  
                            kkt        if ts 0  , 
 
where tkˆ  is capital per capita when proceeding on the posterior Pareto efficient saddle path 
and k  is capital per capita in the posterior steady state. 
  The real interest rate it is  
  
t
t
t k
kAfi 
 ,  .                             (3) 
 
Because the real interest rate equals the rate of time preference at steady state, if the economy 
proceeds on the NJ path, 
 
                             θiθ t ~   if st 0  
                             θit       if ts 0  ,                         (4) 
 
where θ~ is the rate of time preference before the shock and θ  is the rate of time preference 
after the shock. ti  is monotonously continuous and differentiable in t if st 0 . 
 
2.1.4  Expected utility after the shock 
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The expected utility of a household after the shock depends on its choice of J or NJ. Let Jalone 
indicate that the household chooses the J option but the other households choose the NJ option, 
NJalone indicate that the household chooses the NJ option but the other households choose the 
J option, Jtogether indicate that all households choose the J option, and NJtogether indicate 
that all households choose the NJ option. Let  10  pp  be the subjective probability of the 
household that the other households choose the J option (e.g., 0p  indicates that all the 
other households choose option NJ). With p, the expected utility of the household when it 
chooses option J is,  
        JaloneEpJtogetherpEJE 000 1  ,                 (5) 
 
and when it chooses option NJ is 
 
          NJtogetherEpNJalonepENJE 000 1  ,              (6) 
 
where  JaloneE0 ,  NJaloneE0 ,  JtogetherE0 , and  NJtogetherE0  are the expected 
utilities of the household when choosing Jalone, NJalone, Jtogether, and NJtogether, 
respectively. With the properties of J and NJ shown in Sections 2.1.2 and 2.1.3, 
 
             s ts tt dtcuθtdtbcuθtpEJE ˆexpexp000  
             s stt dtacuθtdtbcuθtEp 00 expexp1  ,      (7) 
 
and 
 
              s s ttt dtacuθtdtcuθtpENJE 000 ˆexpexp  
             ss t dtcuθtdtcuθtEp expexp1 00  ,           (8) 
 
where 
 
  s sr qr drdqibθa 0 exp  ,                       (9) 
 
and  
 
  s sr qrtt drdqibia 0 exp  ,                      (10) 
 
and the shock occurred in the period t = 0. Figure 2 shows the paths of Jalone and NJalone. 
Because there is a sufficiently large number of households and the effect of an individual 
household on the whole economy is negligible, then in the case of Jalone the economy almost 
proceeds on the NJ path, and in the case of NJalone it almost proceeds on the J path. If the 
other households choose the NJ option (Jalone or NJtogether), consumption after s is constant 
as c  and capital is adjusted to k  by firms in the period s. In addition, at and it are constant 
after s such that at equals a  and is equals θ, because the economy is at the posterior steady 
state. Nevertheless, during the transition period before s, the value of it changes from the value 
of the prior time preference rate to that of the posterior. If the other households choose option J 
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(NJalone or Jtogether), however, consumption after s is tcˆ  and capital is not adjusted to k  
by firms in the period s and remains at tkˆ . 
  As mentioned in Section 2.1.2, the difference in the returns on financial assets for the 
household from the returns for each of the other households is added to (or subtracted from) its 
consumption in each period after period s. This is described by at and a  in equations (7) and 
(8), and equations (9) and (10) indicate that the accumulated difference in financial assets due to 
bt increases by compound interest between the period r to s. That is, if the household takes the 
NJalone path, it accumulates more financial assets than each of the other J households, and 
instead of immediately consuming these extra accumulated financial assets after period s, the 
household consumes the returns on them in every subsequent period. If the household takes the 
Jalone path, however, its consumption after s is ac  , as shown in equation (7). a  is 
subtracted because the income of each household  tt kAfy , , including the Jalone 
household, decreases equally by bt. Each of the other NJ households decreases consumption by 
bt at the same time, which compensates for the decrease in income; thus, its financial assets (i.e., 
capital per capita; kt) are kept equal to tkˆ . The Jalone household, however, does not decrease 
its consumption, and its financial assets become smaller than those of each of the other NJ 
households, which results in the subtraction of a  after period s. 
 
2.2  Pareto inefficient transition path 2 
2.2.1  Rational Pareto inefficient path  
2.2.1.1  Rational choice of a Pareto inefficient path 
Before examining the economy with non-cooperative households, I first show that, if 
households are cooperative, only option J is chosen as the path after the shock because it gives a 
higher expected utility than option NJ. Because there is no possibility of Jalone and NJalone if 
households are cooperative, then    JtogetherEJE 00   and    NJtogetherENJE 00  . 
Therefore,  
 
     NJEJE 00   
                      ss ts ts tt dtcuθtdtcuθtEdtcuθtdtbcuθtE expexpˆexpexp 0000  
                 0ˆexpexp
00
  s ts ttt dtcucuθtdtcubcuθtE   
 
since ttt bcc   and tcc ˆ . 
  Next, I examine the economy with non-cooperative households. First, the special case 
with a utility function with a sufficiently small γ is examined.  
 
Lemma 1: If   γγ 0  is sufficiently small, then     000  NJtogetherEJaloneE .  
Proof:     NJtogetherEJaloneE
γ 000
lim   
                  s s γtttγ dtcuacuθtEdtcubcuθtE 0 0000 limexplimexp  
       s st dtaθtEdtbθtE 0 00 expexp  
         s
s s s
r qrt
dtθtdrdqibθEdtbθtE expexpexp
0 000
 
                                                  
2 The idea of a rationally chosen Pareto inefficient path was originally presented by Harashima (2004b). 
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       s s sr qrt drdqibθsEdtbθtE 0 000 expexpexp  
      0expexpexp
00
  s st qt dtdqitsθbθsE  , 
because, if  st 0 , then θit   and     st q dqitsθ expexp . Hence, because   tsθ exp  
 st q dqiexp ,     000  NJtogetherEJaloneE  for sufficiently small γ.               ■ 
 
  Second, the opposite special case (i.e., a utility function with a sufficiently large γ) is 
examined.  
 
Lemma 2: If   γγ 0  is sufficiently large and if 
c
a
γ  lim0 , then  JaloneE0  
  00 NJtogetherE . 
Proof: Because tb0 , then      0lim1lim
11
1 


 



 


γ
t
γ
tt
γtttγγ c
c
c
bccubcu
c
γ  for any 
period  st  . On the other hand, because a0 , then for any period  st  , if 1lim0 
 c
a
γ
, 
     


 

 


１
γ
γγγ c
acuacu
c
γ 1
1 1lim
1lim . Thus,     NJtogetherEJaloneE
c
γ
γγ 001
1lim   
              


  dtcuacuθtc γdtcubcuθtc γ γsγγtttγ
s
γγ
limexp1limlimexp1lim 101
00  . Because 01 1 γc
γ  for any   γγ 1 , then if 1lim0   c
a
γ
,  JaloneE0  
  00 NJtogetherE  for sufficiently large  γ .                               ■ 
 
The condition 1lim0   c
a
γ
 indicates that path NJ from c0 to c  deviates sufficiently from 
the posterior Pareto efficient saddle path and reaches the posterior steady state c  not too late. 
Because steady states are irrelevant to the degree of risk aversion (γ), both c0 and c  are 
irrelevant to γ.  
 By Lemmas 1 and 2, it is proved that     000  NJtogetherEJaloneE  is possible. 
 
Lemma 3: If 1lim0   c
a
γ
, then there is a    γγ 0  such that if  γγ , 
    000  NJtogetherEJaloneE . 
Proof: If  0γ  is sufficiently small, then     000  NJtogetherEJaloneE  by Lemma 1, 
and if  γ  is sufficiently large and if 1lim0   c
a
γ
, then    NJtogetherEJaloneE 00   
0  by Lemma 2. Hence, if 1lim0   c
a
γ
, there is a certain    γγ 0  such that, if 
 γγ , then     000  NJtogetherEJaloneE .                               ■ 
 
  However,     000  NJaloneEJtogetherE  because both Jtogether and NJalone 
indicate that all the other households choose option J; thus, the values of it and kt are same as 
 9
those when all households proceed on the posterior Pareto efficient saddle path. Faced with 
these it and kt, deviating alone from the Pareto efficient path (NJalone) gives a lower expected 
utility than Jtogether to the NJ household. Opposite to Jtogether and NJalone, both Jalone and 
NJtogether indicate that all the other households choose option NJ and it and kt are not those of 
the Pareto efficient path. Hence, the sign of    NJtogetherEJaloneE 00   varies depending on 
the conditions, as Lemma 3 indicates.  
  By Lemma 3 and the property     000  NJaloneEJtogetherE , the possibility of 
the choice of a Pareto inefficient transition path, that is,     000  NJEJE , is shown. 
 
Proposition 1: If 1lim0   c
a
γ
 and  γγ , then there is a  10   pp  such that if 
*pp  ,     000  NJEJE , and if *pp ,     000  NJEJE . 
Proof: By Lemma 3, if  γγ , then     000  NJtogetherEJaloneE  and  JtogetherE0    00  NJaloneE . By equations (5) and (6),         NJaloneEJtogetherEpNJEJE 0000   
      NJtogetherEJaloneEp 001  . Thus, if 1lim0   c
a
γ
 and  γγ ,     NJEJE
p 000
lim   
    000  NJtogetherEJaloneE  and          0lim 00001  NJaloneEJtogetherENJEJEp . 
Hence, by the intermediate value theorem, there is  10   pp  such that if *pp  , 
    000  NJEJE  and if *pp ,     000  NJEJE .                                  ■ 
 
Proposition 1 indicates that, if 1lim0 
 c
a
γ
,  γγ , and *pp , then the choice of 
option NJ gives the higher expected utility than that of option J to a household; that is, a 
household may make the rational choice of taking a Pareto inefficient transition path. The 
lemmas and proposition require no friction, and a Pareto inefficient transition path can be 
chosen even in a frictionless economy. This result is very important because it offers 
counter-evidence against the conjecture that households never rationally choose any Pareto 
inefficient transition path in a frictionless economy. 
 
2.2.1.2  Conditions for a rational Pareto inefficient path 
The proposition requires several conditions. Among them,  γγ  may appear rather strict. 
If γ* is very large, option NJ will be rarely chosen. However, if path NJ is such that 
consumption is reduced sharply after the shock, option NJ gives the higher expected utility than 
option J even though γ* is very small. For example, for any   γγ 0 , 
 
           NJtogetherEJaloneE
ss 000
1lim 

 
                    dtcuacuθt
s
dtcubcuθt
s ssttt
s
s
   exp1limexp1lim 000  
             
cd
cdubcubcu
s
bscucucubcu
s 0000
0
0000
lim1  

  
           0
111 0
1
0
1
00
0
1
0
1
00 




 








bγ
c
γ
bccccbγ
cbc γγγγγγ
γ
 , 
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because        0
0
0
000
1
0
1
00
1
1lnlnln
11
lim b
c
bccbccγ
c
γ
bcc
γγ
γ
γ 


 



 

 and  
  0
1
11
lim
11
lim
1
0
0
1
0
1
0
1
00 














 









 γ
c
b
ccγ
c
γ
bcc
γ
γγ
γ
γγ
γ
γ
 due to 0cc  . That is, for each 
combination of path NJ and γ, there is  0s  such that, if  ss , then  JaloneE0    00  NJtogetherE . 
  Consider an example in which path NJ is such that bt is constant as bbt   before s 
(Figure 3); thus  s t bsbE 00 . In this NJ path, consumption is reduced more sharply than it is 
in the case shown in Figure 2. In this case, because   s t bθsbθEa 00 , γ0 , and ts cc   
for st  , then                ssss ttt cubcudtθtEdtcubcuθtE 0000 expexp  
      ss cubcuθ θsE  exp10 , and in addition,         s dtcuacuθtE exp0  
                    cubθscuθ θsEcuacuθ θsEcuacudtθtE s   expexpexp 000 . 
Hence, 
 
              NJtogetherEJaloneE 00   
                ss ttt dtcuacuθtEdtcubcuθtE expexp 000  
                        cubθscuθ θsEcubcuθ θsE ss  expexp1 00  
                            bθscucuθsθscubcuθ θsE ss exp1 expexp10  . 
 
As γ becomes larger, the ratio       bθscucu cubcu ss    becomes smaller; thus, larger values of s can 
satisfy     000  NJtogetherEJaloneE . For example, suppose that c = 10, cs = 10.2, b = 
0.3, and θ = 0.05. If 1γ , then s* = 1.5 at the minimum, and if 5γ , then s* = 6.8 at the 
minimum. This result implies that, if option NJ is such that consumption is reduced relatively 
sharply after the shock (e.g., bbt  ) and *pp  , option NJ will usually be chosen. It is not a 
special case observed only if γ is very large, but it will normally be generated when the value of 
γ is within usually observed values. Conditions for generating a rational Pareto inefficient 
transition path therefore are not strict. In a recession, consumption usually declines sharply after 
the shock, which suggests that households have chosen the NJ option. 
 
2.3  Nash equilibrium 
2.3.1  A Nash equilibrium consisting of NJ strategies  
A household strategically determines whether to choose the J or NJ option, considering other 
households’ choices. All households know that each of them forms expectations about the 
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future values of its utility and makes a decision in the same manner. Since all households are 
identical, the best response of each household is identical. Suppose that there are  NΗ   
identical households in the economy where H is sufficiently large (as assumed in Section 2.1). 
Let  10  ηη qq  be the probability that a household  Ηη   chooses option J. The average 
utility of the other households almost equals that of all households because H is sufficiently 
large. Hence, the average expected utilities of the other households that choose the J and NJ 
options are E0(Jtogether) and E0(NJtogether), respectively. Hence, the payoff matrix of the 
Η-dimensional symmetric mixed strategy game can be described as shown in Table 1. Each 
identical household determines its behavior on the basis of this payoff matrix.  
 In this mixed strategy game, strategy profiles  
 
 (q1,q2,…,qH) = {(1,1,…,1), ( *** ,...,, ppp ), (0,0,…,0)}             (12) 
 
are Nash equilibria for the following reason. By Proposition 1, the best response of a household 
η is J (i.e., qη = 1) if *pp  , indifferent between J and NJ (i.e., any  10,qη ) if *pp  , and 
NJ (i.e., qη = 0) if *pp  . Because all households are identical, the best-response 
correspondence of each household is identical such that qη = {1} if *pp  , [0,1] if *pp  , and 
{0} if *pp   for any household Ηη . Hence, the mixed strategy profiles (1, 1,…,1), 
( *** ,...,, ppp ), and (0,0,…,0) are the intersections of the graph of the best-response 
correspondences of all households. The Pareto efficient saddle path solution (1,1,…,1; i.e., 
Jtogether) is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium, but a Pareto inefficient transition path (0,0,…,0; 
i.e., NJtogether) is also a pure strategy Nash equilibrium. In addition, there is a mixed strategy 
Nash equilibrium ( *** ,...,, ppp ).  
 
2.3.2  Selection of equilibrium 
Determining which Nash equilibrium, either NJtogether (0,0,…,0) or Jtogether (1,1,…,1), is 
dominant requires refinements of the Nash equilibrium, which necessitate additional criteria. 
Here, if households have a risk-averse preference in the sense that they avert the worst scenario 
when its probability is not known, households suppose very low p and select the NJtogether 
(0,0,…,0) equilibrium. Because 
 
              NJaloneEJaloneE 00   
               dtacuacuθtdtcubcuθtE s
s ttttt    00 ˆexpexp  
                            s sttt dtcuacuθtdtcubcuθtE 00 expexp  
              000  NJtogetherEJaloneE  ,                                (13) 
 
by Lemma 3, then Jalone is the worst choice in the sense of the amount of payoff, followed by 
NJtogether, and NJalone, and Jtogether is the best. The outcome of choosing option J is more 
dispersed than that of option NJ. If households have the risk-averse preference in the 
above-mentioned sense and avert the worst scenario when they have no information on its 
probability, a household will prefer the less dispersed option (NJ), fearing the worst situation 
that the household alone substantially increases consumption while the other households 
substantially decrease consumption after the shock. This behavior is rational because it is 
consistent with preferences. Since all households are identical and know inequality (13), all 
households will equally suppose that they all prefer the less dispersed NJ option; therefore, all 
of them will suppose a very low p, particularly 0p , and select the NJtogether (0,0,…,0) 
equilibrium, which is the Nash equilibrium of a Pareto inefficient path. Thereby, unlike most 
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multiple equilibria models, the problem of indeterminacy does not arise, and animal spirits (e.g., 
pessimism or optimism) are unnecessary to explain the selection. 
 
2.4  Amplified generation of unutilized resources 
A Nash equilibrium of a Pareto inefficient path successively generates unutilized products (bt). 
They are left unused, discarded, or preemptively not produced during the path. Unused or 
discarded goods and services indicate a decline in sales and an increase in inventory for firms. 
Preemptively suspended production results in an increase in unemployment and idle capital. As 
a result, profits decline and some parts of firms need to be liquidated, which is unnecessary if 
the economy proceeds on the J path (i.e., the posterior Pareto efficient path). If the liquidation is 
implemented immediately after the shock, bt will no longer be generated, but such a liquidation 
would generate a tremendous shock. The process of the liquidation, however, will take time 
because of various frictions, and excess capital that generates bt will remain for a long period. 
During the period when capital is not reduced to the posterior steady-state level, unutilized 
products are successively generated. In a period, bt is generated and eliminated, but in the next 
period, another, new, bt is generated and eliminated. This cycle is repeated in every period 
throughout the transition path, and it implies that demand is lower than supply in every period. 
This phenomenon may be interpreted as a general glut or a persisting disequilibrium by some 
definitions of equilibrium. 
 
2.5  Time preference shock as the exceptional shock 
Not all shocks result in a Nash equilibrium of a Pareto inefficient path. If anything, this type of 
shock is limited because it needs to force consumption to fluctuate very jaggedly to maintain 
Pareto efficiency. A Pareto inefficient path is preferred, because these substantially jagged 
fluctuations can be averted. An upward time preference shock is one such shock, as shown in 
Figure 1. Other examples are rare, because shocks that do not change the steady state (e.g., 
monetary shocks) are not relevant. One other example is a technology regression, which would 
move the vertical line 0
dt
dct  to the left in Figure 1 and necessitate a jagged consumption 
path to keep Pareto efficiency. In this sense, technology and time preference shocks have similar 
effects on economic fluctuations. However, a technology regression also simultaneously moves 
the curve 0
dt
dkt  downwards, and accordingly, the Pareto efficient saddle path also moves 
downwards. Therefore, the jagged consumption is smoothed out to some extent. As a result, the 
substantially jagged consumption that can generate a recession would require a large-scale, 
sudden, and sharp regression in technology, which does not seem very likely. An upward time 
preference shock, however, only moves the vertical line 0
dt
dct  to the left. 
  In some macro-economic models with multiple equilibra, however, changing 
equilibria may necessitate substantially jagged consumptions to keep Pareto optimality. There 
are many types of multiple equilibra models that depend on various types of increasing returns, 
externalities, or complementarities, but they are vulnerable to a number of criticisms (e.g., 
insufficient explanation of the switching mechanism; see, e.g., Morris and Shin, 2001). 
Examining the properties, validity, and plausibility of each of these many and diverse models is 
beyond the scope of this paper. 
 
2.6  Endogenous time preference 
The results in the above sections raise the question: what force drives households to shift their 
rates of time preference upwards? Keynes’s (1936) argument suggests that an upward time 
preference shift is caused by a change in households’ moods. Indeed, preferences may change 
stochastically by fluctuating moods. However, it is not compelling to accept the idea of animal 
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spirits ad hoc because it implies irrationality. Before arbitrarily assuming irrationality, we 
should search for all possibilities of mechanisms by which an upward time preference shift is 
endogenously generated as a consequence of rational agents’ rational behavior. 
 
2.6.1  Endogenous time preference models 
2.6.1.1  Uzawa’s (1968) endogenous time preference model 
The most well-known endogenous time preference model is that of Uzawa (1968). It has been 
applied to many analyses (e.g., Epstein and Hynes, 1983; Lucas and Stokey, 1984; Epstein, 
1987; Obstfeld, 1990). However, Uzawa’s model has not necessarily been regarded as a realistic 
expression of endogeneity of time preference because it has a serious drawback in that 
impatience increases as income, consumption and utility increase. The basic structure of 
Uzawa’s model is 
 
   tt cuθθ   , 
 t
t
cdu
dθ0  ,                             (14) 
 
in which the rate of time preference θt in period t is time-variable and an increasing function of 
present utility u(ct). The problem is that  t
t
cdu
dθ0  is necessary for the model to be stable. 
This property is quite controversial and difficult to accept a priori, because many empirical 
studies have indicated that the rate of time preference is negatively correlated with permanent 
income (e.g., Lawrance, 1991); thus, many economists are critical of Uzawa’s model. Epstein 
(1987), however, argues the plausibility of increasing impatience and offers some 
counter-arguments. However, his view is in the minority and most economists support 
arguments in favor of the decreasing rate of time preference such that   0t
t
cdu
dθ . Hence, 
although Uzawa’s model attracted attention from economists such as Epstein and Hynes (1983), 
Lucas and Stokey (1984), and Obstfeld (1990), analysis of the endogeneity of time preference 
has progressed very little. Although Uzawa’s model may be flawed, that does not necessarily 
mean that the conjecture that the rate of time preference is influenced by future income, 
consumption, and utility is fallacious, just that an appropriate model in which the rate of time 
preference is negatively correlated with income, consumption, and utility has not been 
presented.  
 
2.6.1.2  Size effect on impatience 
The problem of  t
t
cdu
dθ0  in Uzawa’s model arises because distant future levels of 
consumption have little influence on factors that form the rate of time preference; that is, it is 
formed only with the information on present consumption, and it must be revised every period 
in accordance with consumption growth. However, there is no a priori reason why information 
on distant future activities should be far less important than the information on the present and 
near future activities. Fisher (1930) argued that 
 
[O]ur first step, then, is to show how a person's impatience depends on the size 
of his income, assuming the other three conditions to remain constant; for, 
evidently, it is possible that two incomes may have the same time shape, 
composition and risk, and yet differ in size, one being, say, twice the other in 
every period of time. 
  In general, it may be said that, other things being equal, the smaller the 
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income, the higher the preference for the present over the future income. It is 
true of course that a permanently small income implies a keen appreciation of 
wants as well as of immediate wants. … But it increases the want for immediate 
income even more than it increases the want for future income.” (p. 72) 
 
According to Fisher’s (1930) view, a force that influences time preference is a psychological 
response derived from the perception of the “size of the entire income or utility stream.” This 
view indicates that it is necessary to probe how people perceive the size of the entire income or 
utility stream. 
  Little effort has been directed towards probing the nature of the size of utility or 
income stream on time preference, although a large number of psychological experiments have 
been made with regard to anomalies of the expected utility model with a constant rate of time 
preference (e.g., Frederick et al., 2002). Turning to research in economics, analyses using 
endogenous time preference models so far have merely introduced the a priori assumption of 
endogeneity of time preference without explaining its reasoning in detail. Hence, even now, 
Fisher’s (1930) insights are very useful for the examination of the size effect. An important 
point in Fisher’s above quote is that the size of the infinite utility stream is perceived as 
“permanently” high or low. The size difference among the utility streams may be perceived as 
the permanent continuing difference of utilities among different utility streams. Anticipation of 
the permanently higher utility may enhance an emotional sense of well-being because people 
feel they have a long-lasting secure situation, which will generate a positive psychological 
response and make people more patient. If that is true, distant future utilities should be taken 
into account equally with the present utility. Otherwise, it is impossible to distinguish whether 
the difference of utilities continues permanently.  
  From this point of view, the specification that only the present utility influences the 
formation of time preference, as is the case of Uzawa’s model, is inadequate as the specification 
of the size of utility stream. Instead, a simple measure of the size where entire utilities from the 
present to distant future are summed with equal weight will be more appropriate as the measure 
of the size of a utility stream.3 
 
2.6.2  Model of time preference 4 
2.6.2.1  The model 
Because no strategic situation is supposed in this section unlike in Sections 2.1 - 2.5, the usual 
representative household is assumed for simplicity, and the representative household solves the 
maximization problem indicated in equations (1) and (2). Taking the arguments in Section 2.6.1 
into account, the “size” of the infinite utility stream can be defined as follows. 
 
Definition 1: The size of the utility stream W for a given technology A is  
 
    T tT dtcutρEW 00lim  ,                       (15) 
 
where 
 
                            
T
tρ 1   if Tt 0  
                             0tρ    otherwise.  
                                                  
3 Das (2003) shows another stable endogenous time preference model with decreasing impatience. Her model is 
stable, although the rate of time preference is decreasing because endogenous impatience is almost constant. In this 
sense, the situation her model describes is very special. 
4 The idea of this type of endogenous time preference model was originally presented by Harashima (2004a). 
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The variable  tρ  indicates weights and has the same value in any period. Thus, the weights 
for evaluation of future utilities are distributed evenly over time, as argued in Section 2.6.1. 
 To this point in my argument, technology A has been assumed to be constant, but if A 
is time-variable (At) and grows at a constant rate and the economy is on a balanced growth path 
such that At, yt, kt, and ct grow at the same rate, then the definition of W needs to be modified 
because any stream of ct and u(ct) grows to infinity, and it is impossible to distinguish the sizes 
of the utility stream by simply summing up ct with T  as shown in Definition 1. Because 
balanced growth is possible only when technological progress is Harrod neutral, I assume a 
Harrod neutral production function such that 
 
  1ttt kωAy  ,                            (16) 
 
where  10   and  ωω 0  are constants. To distinguish the sizes of utility stream, 
the following value is set as the standard stream of utility, 
 
  ψtecu ~  , 
 
where  cc ~0~   is a constant and  ψψ 0  is a constant rate of growth. Streams of utility are 
compared with this standard stream. Because the utility function is CRRA as shown in Section 
2.1, a stream of utility in comparison with the standard stream of utility is  
 
       

ψt
t
γγψt
γ
t
ψt
t
e
cu
c
γ
ec
c
ecu
cu
11
1
~
1
~~
 . 
 
By using this ratio, a stream of utility can be distinguished from the standard stream of utility. 
That is, the size of a utility stream W for a given stream of technology At that grows at the same 
rate ψ as yt, kt, and ct can be alternatively defined as 
 
   
T
ψt
t
T
dt
e
cutρEW
00
lim  .                      (17) 
 
Clearly, if ψ = 0, then the size (W) degenerates into the one shown in Definition 1. 
  If there is a steady state such that  
 
       cuEcuE tt 00lim  ,                      (18) 
 
or for the case of expected balanced growth 
 
     cuEecuE ψttt 00lim  ,                      (19) 
 
where c* is a constant and indicates steady-state consumption, then  
    cuEW 0                              (20) 
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for the following reason. Because        cuEcuE tt 00lim (or   ψttt ecuE 0lim    cuE0 ), then 
 
            WcuEdtcuEcuEtρT tT    00 00lim  
(or         WcuEdt
e
cuEcuEtρT ψttT 





 

   00 00lim ). 
 
In addition,  
 
         0lim
0 00
  dtcuEcuEtρT tT  
(or      0lim
0 00







 

  dtecuEcuEtρ
T
ψt
t
T
) . 
 
Hence,    cuEW 0 ; that is, the rate of time preference is determined by steady-state 
consumption (c*). 
  The model of time preference in this paper is constructed on the basis of this measure 
of W. An essential property that must be incorporated into the model is that the rate of time 
preference is sensitive to, and a function of, W such that 
 
  Wθθ   , 
 
where  Wθ   is monotonously continuous and continuously differentiable. Because W is a 
sum of utilities, this property simply reflects the core idea of endogenous time preference. 
However, this property is new in the sense that the rate of time preference is sensitive not only 
to the present utility but also the entire stream of utility, that is, the size of utility stream 
represented by the utility for steady-state consumption. This property is intuitively acceptable 
because it is likely that people set their principles or parameters for their behaviors considering 
the final consequences (i.e., the steady state; see, e.g., Barsky and Sims, 2009).  
 Another essential property that must be incorporated into the model is 
 
 0
dW
d θ  . 
 
Because    cuEW 0  and  
t
t
dc
cdu0 , the rate of time preference is inversely proportionate 
to c*. This property is consistent with the findings in many empirical studies, which have shown 
that the rate of time preference is negatively correlated with permanent income (e.g., Lawrance, 
1991).  
  In summary, the basic structure of the model is: 
 
        cuEθWθθ 0  , 
   00  cudE dθdWdθ  .                        (21) 
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This model is deceptively similar to Uzawa’s endogenous time preference model (14), simply 
replacing ct with c* and  t
t
cdu
dθ0  with    00 cudE dθ . However, the two models are 
completely different because of the opposite characteristics between   t
t
cdu
dθ0  and 
   00 cudE dθ .  
 
2.6.2.2  Nature of the model 
The model (21) can be regarded as successful only if it exhibits stability. In Uzawa’s model, the 
economy becomes unstable if  t
t
cdu
dθ0  is replaced with   0t
t
cdu
dθ . In this section, I 
examine the stability of the model. 
 
2.6.2.2.1  Equilibrium rate of time preference 
In Ramsey-type models, such as equations (1) and (2), if a constant rate of time preference is 
given, the value of marginal product of capital (i.e., the value of the real interest rate) converges 
to that of the given rate of time preference as the economy approaches the steady state. Hence, 
when a rate of time preference is specified at a certain value, the corresponding expected 
steady-state consumption is uniquely determined. Given fixed values of other exogenous 
parameters, any predetermined rate of time preference has unique values of expected 
consumption and utility at steady state. There is a one-to-one correspondence between the 
expected utilities at steady state and the rates of time preference; therefore, the expected utility 
at steady state can be expressed as a function of the rate of time preference. Let xc  be a set of 
steady-state consumptions, given a set of time preference rates (θx) and other fixed exogenous 
parameters. The function θ → W argued above can be described as  
 
     WcuEθg  0 , 
 
where   xcc  and xθθ . On the other hand, the rate of time preference is a continuous 
function of steady-state consumption as shown in the model (21) such that 
       cuEθWθθ 0 . The reverse function is  
 
      WcuEθh  0  . 
 
  The equilibrium rate of time preference is determined by the point of intersection of 
the two functions,  θg  and  θh , as shown in Figure 4. Figure 5 shows a special but 
conventionally assumed  θh , in which θ is not sensitive to W, and the rate of time preference 
is constant permanently. There exists a point of intersection because both  θg  and  θh  
are monotonously continuous for 0θ .  θh  is monotonously continuous because  Wθ   
is monotonously continuous.  θg  is monotonously continuous because, as a result of utility 
maximization,    k fc  and   dkkdf  θ , where k  is capital input per capita at steady 
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state such that  tt kk   lim . Because  k f  and  

dk
kdf  are monotonously continuous 
for 0k , c* is a monotonously continuous function of θ for 0θ . Here, because u is 
monotonously continuous, then     θgcuE 0  is also monotonously continuous for 
0θ .  
  The function      WcuEθg  0  is a decreasing function of θ because the higher 
rate of time preference results in the lower steady state consumption. The function 
     WcuEθh  0  is also a decreasing function of θ because 0dWdθ . Thus, both  θg  
and  θh  are decreasing, but the slope of  θh  is steeper than that of  θg  as shown in 
Figure 4. This is true because   Wθg  is the consequence of the Ramsey-type model 
indicated in equations (1) and (2); thus, if θ , then   0Wθg  because  tiθ  
and 0tk , and if 0θ , then   Wθg  because 0 tiθ  and tk . On the 
other hand, the function   Wθh   indicates the endogeneity of time preference, and because 
the rate of time preference is usually neither zero nor infinity, then even if   0Wθh , 
θ , and    Wθh , θ0 . Hence, the locus   Wθh  cuts the locus   Wθg   
downwards from the top, as shown in Figure 4. Because the locus   Wθh   is more vertical 
than   Wθg  , a permanently constant rate of time preference, as shown in Figure 5, has 
probably been used as an approximation of the locus   Wθh   for simplicity.  
 
2.6.2.2.2  Stability of the model 
The rate of time preference is constant unless a shock that changes the expectation of c* occurs. 
This is self-evident by    cuEW 0 . W does not depend on t but on the expectation of c*; thus, 
the same rate of time preference and steady state continue until such a shock hits the economy. 
Therefore, the endogeneity of time preference matters only when such a shock occurs. This 
constancy is the key for the stability of the model (21). Once the rate of time preference 
corresponding to the intersection is determined, it is constant and the economy converges at a 
unique steady state unless a shock that changes the expectation of c* occurs. This shock is 
exogenous to the model, and the economy does not explode endogenously but stabilizes at the 
steady state. Hence, the property 0
dW
dθ  in model (21), which is consistent with empirical 
findings, does not cause instability. 
  Model (21) therefore is acceptable as a model of endogenous time preference, which 
indicates that, because the rate of time preference is endogenously determined, irrationality is 
not necessary for determination of the time preference rate. Nevertheless, a shock on the rate of 
time preference is initiated by a shock on the expectation of c*; thus, even though animal spirits 
are directly irrelevant to determination of the time preference rate, they may be relevant to the 
generation of shock on the expectation of c*. This possibility is examined in Section 2.6.4. 
 
2.6.3  Uncertainty and time preference 
An important feature of the model (21) is that a shock on uncertainty makes the rate of time 
preference shift, where uncertainty means the stochastic nature of the steady-state consumption 
(c*). This is not a new idea. Fisher (1930) argued that uncertainty, or risk, must naturally have an 
influence on the rate of time preference, and higher uncertainty tends to raise the rate of time 
preference. This feature is particularly important for examining the mechanism of recession, 
because it has been reported that uncertainty increases in a recession (e.g., Romer, 1990).  
  The uncertainty about c* can be described by the stochastic dominance of the 
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distribution of c* in a second-degree sense or a Rothschild-Stigliz sense. Given  cF , a 
subjective cumulative distribution function of  bca c   0 ,  
 
         ba cdFcucuEW 0  .                   (22) 
 
Consider two steady-state consumptions 1c  and 

2c . Because  cu  is increasing and 
concave in c*, then       cuE cuE   1020  if  1cF  second degree stochastically dominates  2cF , with strict inequality for a set of values of c* with positive probability. If  1cF  
stochastically dominates  2cF  in the Rothschild-Stigliz sense, then       cuE cuE   1020  
and the mean of c* is preserved as well. 
  Suppose that a shock on the distribution of c* occurs, which preserves the mean but 
makes the uncertainty increase for any θ. Because utility  cu  is increasing and concave, this 
increase in uncertainty indicates a shift of the locus   Wθg   downwards to the bold dashed 
line shown in Figure 4, because    cuEW 0  becomes smaller for any θ. Hence, if the 
uncertainty about c* increases from  1cF  to  2cF  in the Rothschild-Stigliz sense,    cuEW 0  decreases. Even though the mean of c* is not preserved, if the uncertainty about 
c* increases from  1cF  to  2cF  in the second-degree sense,    cuEW 0  also 
decreases. If the mean of c* decreases simultaneously, the locus   Wθg   shifts further 
downwards to the thin dashed line in Figure 4. Therefore, the equilibrium rate of time 
preference increases; that is, increased uncertainty makes households more myopic. The effect 
of uncertainty in the model (21) is thus consistent with Fisher’s (1930) argument.5  
 
2.6.4  Government failure 
Animal spirits may influence the generation of shocks on the expectation of c*, but the arbitrary 
assumption of animal spirits is not compelling. In this section, I explore a mechanism that 
generates a shock on the expectation of c* without the need to invoke animal spirits. 
 
2.6.4.1  Policy-induced stochastic processes 
2.6.4.1.1  A stochastic process with an absorbing state 
Because it is not present consumption (ct) but steady-state consumption (c*) that matters, the 
factor that generates a shock on the expectation of c* should have persistent effects on 
consumption. Thereby, the factor should be one of the deep parameters (e.g., total factor 
productivity (TFP) and preferences) that can change the steady state. In addition, since it has 
been reported that uncertainty increases in a recession (e.g., Romer, 1990), the factor should 
make c* be expected to be random with a constant probability distribution. For the endogenous 
variable c* to be expected to be random, exogenous random variables are required because, 
without exogenous random variables, endogenous variables are constant at steady state. 
Nevertheless, exogenous variables that make c* be expected to be substantially random with a 
constant probability distribution are not easily found among the deep parameters. If the 
exogenous stochastic valuable is a stationary process with a known constant steady-state 
probability distribution, c* is expected to be smoothed by the stochastic Ramsey-Euler equation 
and to become nearly deterministic (e.g., Brock and Mirman, 1972; Mirman and Zilcha, 1977). 
On the other hand, if it is a random walk, it does not have a constant probability distribution.  
                                                  
5 Harashima (2004a) shows that the rate of time preference and uncertainty in Japan simultaneously rose at the end 
of 1990s just before Japan entered a severe and persistent economic slump.  
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  Hence, for c* to be expected to be substantially random with a constant probability 
distribution, a special process of the exogenous stochastic variable is required. The following 
jump process with an absorbing state (Ψt) is such a process. For an unknown future period  tt 0 ,  
 
                   



ttifstateabsorbingticdeterminis
ttifstateabsorbingnonrandomΨ t 0  ,            (23) 
 
where there are finite  NΛ   deterministic states after the period t . Which of the states 
becomes the absorbing state of Ψt after t  is unknown until t , but the probability distribution 
of the absorbing state is known for any t before t . Let state  Λλ   take the value vλ and its 
probability density function be  λvτ . Then, the present expected value of Ψt at steady state is    


Λ
λ
λλtt vτvΨE
1
0 lim . If the value of each state is time-variable as vλ,t but converges at each 
constant value if t → ∞, then the present expected value of Ψt at steady state is   tt ΨE lim0   
 
Λ
λ
λ,ttλ,tt
vτv
1
limlim  and its probability density function is  λ,tt vτ lim . An important feature 
of the process Ψt is that c* is not expected to be smoothed by the stochastic Ramsey-Euler 
equation because it is only after t  that one of the deterministic paths (vλ,t) that is chosen as the 
absorbing state is known, and consumption proceeds solely in accordance with this unique 
deterministic path. Therefore c* is expected to be random with a constant probability 
distribution depending on randomly distributed deterministic paths vλ,t after t . 
 
2.6.4.1.2  Policy-induced elements 
An important feature of this Ψt-type process is that the unique future deterministic path is 
decided in the future. This feature is often observed in a government’s policy decisions, which 
often take time to make. Once the government has made a decision, the path is deterministic, 
but before the decision, the path is uncertain. Governments sometimes postpone decisions 
because they are difficult (e.g., tax hike decisions). As a result, before the policy is decided, 
households have uncertainty with a constant probability distribution of the deterministic path. 
Hence, the necessity of a Ψt-type process for the exogenous variable that makes c* be expected 
to be substantially random with a constant probability distribution suggests that the exogenous 
variable is policy related. 
  A Ψt-type process implies that, even though the exogenous variable is a stationary 
process, if it has break points in its process then c* can be expected to be substantially random. 
The factors that break a stationary process require exogenous mechanisms. Some structural 
changes in the mechanism of forming TFP or preferences will be necessary. Nevertheless, the 
mechanisms of forming TFP and preferences do not usually change. One of the few possibilities 
for change is that the mechanism is policy related because policies are changed at the discretion 
of governments, and stationary processes will occasionally break if they are related to policies. 
Therefore, the necessary properties of the exogenous variable, whether it takes a Ψt-type process 
or not, suggest that the exogenous variable is policy related. The policy-induced element in TFP 
is particularly important, because production is substantially affected by the TFP level.6  
 
2.6.4.2  A policy-induced financial element in TFP 
2.6.4.2.1  Financial elements in TFP 
                                                  
6 The policies on TFP related to c* are usually policies on economic structure and do not include discretionary 
macro-economic (fiscal and monetary) policies. 
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An important element in TFP is natural science technologies and knowledge. They are usually 
assumed to be stochastic, primarily because of the random nature of scientific discoveries and 
inventions. However, that randomness implies a random walk that has no constant probability 
distribution and, more importantly, no steady state. Therefore, scientific technology and 
knowledge will not be the element in TFP that changes the expected distribution of c*. 
  Elements in TFP are not limited, however, to natural science technologies and 
knowledge. In the production function   1ttt kωAy  (equation (16)), At usually indicates 
natural science technologies and knowledge, but TFP is not At but tωA . If ω contains a 
policy-induced element, TFP is affected by the policy. Financial elements are included in this 
group of policy-induced elements. Economic development is proportionate to the level of 
financial development (e.g., Wachtel, 2003; Do and Levchenko, 2007), and wide differences of 
financial development have existed between developed and developing economies. Many 
studies have concluded that the causality is from financial development to economic activities 
(e.g., Levine, 1997; La Porta el al., 1998; Levine et al., 2000). In addition, the importance of 
financial development as a driving force of economic growth has been repeatedly emphasized 
(e.g., Levine, 1997; Levine et al., 2000; Temple, 2000; Easterly and Levine, 2003). Financial 
development reduces friction in markets, especially in capital accumulation and technological 
innovation (e.g., Levine, 1997), and financial systems play a critical role in allocation of 
resources, which is crucial for innovative activities (e.g., Schumpeter, 1912/1934; Shaw, 1973). 
These facts and arguments indicate that the financial element in TFP is an important 
determinant of the parameter ω and has significant effects on TFP. An important feature of the 
financial element is that it is closely related to government policies and thus has a Ψt-type 
process, because there is an important imperfection in financial markets—there is asymmetric 
information between borrowers (firms) and lenders (investors)—and it needs to be eliminated 
by government.  
 
2.6.4.2.2  Asymmetric information 
The problem of imperfection in financial markets has long been studied (e.g., Gertler, 1988; 
Mishkin, 1991). Lenders usually have less information than borrowers. Under this asymmetric 
information, lenders may lend their money to less appropriate and lower quality borrowers, 
which indicates that resources including technologies are not optimally allocated in the 
economy.7 If there is no asymmetric information, the optimal allocation of resources in the 
economy will be achieved by rational activities of investors, but if there is asymmetric 
information, the allocation will be distorted. Non-optimal allocation of resources decreases the 
economy’s overall efficiency, and TFP becomes lower in the long run if asymmetric 
information is left as it is.   
  Financial intermediaries mitigate the asymmetric information. Because financial 
intermediaries join in activities between firms and investors, the asymmetric information is 
separated into two parts: between firms and financial intermediaries, and between financial 
intermediaries and investors. The former will be reduced substantially by activities of financial 
intermediaries that monitor and investigate information on firms. Nevertheless, the latter is 
usually not easily minimized because of the principal-agent problem between investors and 
financial intermediaries. A financial intermediary (the agent) has an incentive to divert its 
behaviors from what an investor (the principal) wishes if there is asymmetric information and 
the investor does not know whether the contract has been satisfied. As a result, markets are 
distorted.  
  To reduce the principal-agent problem, investors must sufficiently monitor financial 
intermediaries. Investors, however, including individual small depositors of banks, cannot 
sufficiently monitor the intermediaries because such monitoring requires very complex 
                                                  
7 Not all technologies are embodied in a unit of capital, and each capital embodies only a portion of technologies. 
The adequate allocation of technologies over capital is important for maximizing production efficiency. 
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processes, special skills, and a great deal of technical knowledge. More importantly, it is 
necessary to access perfect information on financial intermediaries and firms. If signals in 
financial markets contain and transmit perfect information on financial intermediaries and firms, 
investors may sufficiently monitor financial intermediaries, but many empirical studies have 
shown that the information is not perfect. For example, DeYoung et al. (2001) show that 
supervisors’ assessments of banks contain some information that is not incorporated into prices 
of subordinated debts in markets. Other studies have also shown that signals from financial 
markets do not contain and transmit information perfectly (e.g., see Berger et al., 2000; Curry et 
al., 2008; Furlong and Williams, 2006). Such imperfect market signals suggest that some 
information—in particular, bad information—is deliberately hidden from markets. 
 
2.6.4.2.3  The financial supervision authority 
The market’s inability to solve the problem of asymmetric information justifies the 
government’s intervention to eliminate the distortion. On behalf of investors, the financial 
supervision authority eliminates the asymmetric information. As argued in Section 2.6.4.2.2, the 
problem of asymmetric information is separated into two parts. With addition of a financial 
supervision authority, the problem is further divided: asymmetric information between firms 
and financial intermediaries, between financial intermediaries and the authority, and between 
the authority and investors. The first two parts can be solved by financial intermediaries and the 
authority, respectively. The last part is not necessarily easily solved, however, because investors 
cannot fully monitor the authority’s activities. They have to trust the authority. Hence, 
self-regulation is quite important for the authority.  
  It is very difficult to be perfect, and the supervision may occasionally fail. Such failure 
is more likely to occur and be more severe after regulations have been substantially changed, for 
example, after deregulation. In such cases, the financial supervision authority has to innovate to 
adapt to the new regulations. Because the authority is a monopoly, its failure is not a single 
negligible error among many authorities,8 and once the supervision fails, its negative effects 
will spread widely through financial markets. In addition, there is also a principal-agent problem 
between the authority and investors. The authority has an incentive to hide its failure from 
investors, and if the authority deliberately hides its failure, investors cannot easily know of the 
failure. 
  If asymmetric information is unchecked because of the failure of supervision, financial 
intermediaries will obtain extra profits thanks to the asymmetric information. The negative 
effect of non-optimal allocation of resources will be recognized only by less-informed investors 
and households far later. Faced with the extra profits of financial intermediaries, less-informed 
investors and households may wrongly guess that technology is unexpectedly progressing more 
than it actually is. The lee-informed households will then undertake activities on the basis of 
this incorrect guess—activities that would be considered to be irrational if perfect information 
were available—and this may make the economy spuriously appear to be in a boom in the short 
run. 
 
2.6.4.2.4  Revelation of the failure of supervision 
Even if an authority deliberately hides its failure, it is impossible to hide it forever. Because 
there is a gap between the distorted expectation by less-informed households and actual 
economic activities, the failure will eventually be revealed, perhaps by accident. When the 
failure is revealed, the trust in the financial supervision authority will immediately be lost, and 
the expectation of future policy will change suddenly and sharply. Because the financial element 
in TFP is a policy-induced element and has a Ψt-type process, the expected probability 
distribution of the financial element in TFP at steady state will also immediately change. 
  The arguments in Section 2.6.4.2.2 indicate that the present financial element in TFP 
                                                  
8 In some economies, the authority is separated across a few branches in the government, depending on the type of 
financial intermediary, but each branch is a monopoly authority for each of type of intermediary.  
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will not change suddenly and sharply, because the already allocated resources cannot change 
suddenly and sharply. Nevertheless, unlike the present financial element in TFP, the expected 
probability distribution of the financial element in TFP at steady state can change suddenly and 
sharply with the revelation of the failure of supervision. In addition, the failure of supervision 
implies that the expected distributions of the financial element in TFP and c* were wrongly 
formed before the revelation of the failure; thus, the revisions of the expected distributions of 
the financial element in TFP and c* resulting from the revelation will be more substantial than 
usual. As a result, the rate of time preference is immediately raised and a Nash equilibrium of a 
Pareto inefficient path will be immediately selected even though the present TFP is almost 
unchanged. 
 
3  CYCLICAL VOLATILITY OF THE V-U RATIO 
 
3.1  The Nash equilibrium of a Pareto inefficient path 
Harashima (2009) shows that a Nash equilibrium of a Pareto inefficient path is generated even 
in a frictionless economy if—and probably only if—the rate of time preference shifts. An 
essential reason for the generation of this Nash equilibrium is that households are intrinsically 
risk averse and not cooperative. In a strategic environment, this generates the possibility that, if 
consumption needs to be substantially and discontinuously increased to keep Pareto optimality, 
a non-cooperative household’s strategy to deviate from the Pareto optimal path gives a higher 
expected utility than the strategy of choosing the Pareto optimal path. 
 A weaknesses of the dynamic stochastic general equilibrium approach to 
macroeconomics stems from going too directly from statements about individuals to statements 
about the aggregate (Caballero, 2010). The Nash equilibrium of a Pareto inefficient path is an 
answer to this problem because this equilibrium is not derived from a simple summation of 
individuals’ identical behaviors but is a result of strategic interactions among non-cooperative 
individuals. 
 The difference in consumption between the Pareto inefficient path in this Nash 
equilibrium and the conventional Pareto efficient path in each period t is bt (≥ 0 for upward time 
preference shocks). bt is successively generated and eliminated on the Pareto inefficient path. 
 
3.1  Matching friction 
The standard version of the search and matching model by Shimer (2004) is used in this paper 
as the base model. The model is a simplified version of the model by Pissarides (1985). The 
economy consists of a measure 1 of risk-neutral, infinitely lived workers and a continuum of 
risk-neutral, infinitely lived firms. The common discount rate of workers and firms is r. An 
unemployed worker gets flow utility z from non-market activity and searches for a job. An 
employed worker earns an endogenous wage w but may not search. The production function 
exhibits constant returns to scale, and for simplicity only labor inputs are used for production. 
Although capital inputs do not affect production, they are implicitly assumed and can affect 
matching friction only if they affect parameter values in the model. By employing a worker, a 
firm obtains profit equal to the difference between labor productivity π and the wage (i.e., π − 
w). Jobs end at rate σ, which leaves a worker unemployed and a firm with a vacancy. In order to 
hire a worker, a firm must maintain an open vacancy at flow cost κ. 
 Matching technology is assumed to be a Cobb–Douglas and constant returns to scale. 
Thereby, the rate at which unemployed workers find jobs and the rate at which vacancies are 
filled depend only on the endogenous v-u ratio in period t, 



e,t
c,t
t u
v , where ue,t is the 
unemployment rate in period t, and vc,t is the job vacancy rate in period t. Workers find jobs at 
rate αtμ 1  and vacancies are filled at rate αtμ  , where μ is a parameter and  10  αα  is 
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the elasticity of the matching function with respect to the unemployment rate. The 
unemployment rate ue,t increases with job destruction and decreases when workers find jobs, 
and thus it moves such that 
   e,tαte,te,t uμuσu  11   .                      (24) 
 
 This matching process is summarized by the following Bellman equations: 
  UEμzrU α  1                           (25) 
  EUσwrE                              (26) 
  VFμκrV α                             (27) 
  FVσwπrF   .                         (28) 
 
Equations (25) and (26) indicate the value of a worker when unemployed (U) and employed (E), 
respectively. If unemployed, the worker gets current value from non-market activity z and finds 
a job at the rate αμ 1 . When employed, the worker earns wage w and loses the job at rate σ. 
Equations (27) and (28) indicate the value of a job that is vacant (V) or filled (F), respectively. A 
free entry condition for vacancies is assumed, and firms create job openings until  
 
V = 0 .                               (29) 
 
In addition, wages are assumed to be set by asymmetric Nash bargaining. At any point in time 
all workers are paid a common wage w. The Nash bargaining assumption amounts to 
 
β
VF
β
UE


1
 ,                           (30) 
 
where  10  ββ  represents workers’ bargaining power. By equations (25)–(30), 
 
  κ
zπββμ
σr
α
 1  .                       (31) 
 
Equation (31) determines the v-u ratio φ when the values of α, β, κ, μ, π, σ, and r are given. 
 
3.2  The effect of successive bt on the v-u ratio 
A Nash equilibrium of a Pareto inefficient path successively generates large amounts of 
unutilized products bt and creates a great deal of idle and discarded resources. As shown in 
Section 2, this Nash equilibrium has significant impacts on various aspects of the economy, and 
the matching process shown in Section 3.1 is no exception. In this section, I examine in detail 
how successive bt affects the matching process. 
 The Nash equilibrium of a Pareto inefficient path yields an unusual path on which 
Pareto inefficiency (successive bt) is persistently generated. As shown in Section 2, successive bt 
distorts the economy and changes various conditions for economic activities in many aspects. In 
the matching process shown in Section 3.1, the conditions are represented by the values of the 
parameters α, β, κ, μ, π, σ, and r. These values are usually assumed to be unchanged, but the 
distortion may cause them to change substantially. Moreover, if any of them do change, the v-u 
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ratio also will change from that when bt is not generated by equation (31). Furthermore, because 
the generation of bt persists as shown in Section 2, the values of the v-u ratio will stay different 
for a long period; thus, if time preference shocks occur, the v-u ratio will also fluctuate as a 
result of the successively generated bt. The respective effects of successive bt on the parameters 
σ, μ, κ, and π are examined in detail in the following sections. 
 Note that the rate of time preference can shift up or down. The effects of a downward 
time preference shock are opposite to those of an upward one, and negative bt is generated by 
the same mechanism as positive bt. If bt is negative, the economy booms. Goods and services 
and resources for inputs become scarce and need to be supplemented immediately through the 
creation of extra resources from scratch. However, in practical terms, the immediate creation of 
resources is physically very difficult; thus the needed goods and services will be substituted 
through the increased utilization of existing resources, for example, by increasing the amount of 
overtime work and rates of operation. The stream of negative bt will therefore be considerably 
constrained. 
 
3.2.1  The effect of successive bt on separation rate 
As positive bt is successively generated, it is successively eliminated through products being 
discarded or through the preemptive suspension of production, leaving some capital and labor 
inputs idle, as shown in Section 2. Firms will eliminate excess workers by either firing them or 
abstaining from recruiting new workers. The former measure relates to the separation rate σ, 
whereas the latter relates to vacancy costs κ, which will be examined in greater detail in Section 
3.2.3. Firing workers usually imposes additional costs on firms. These costs are implicit in the 
model presented in Section 3.1, but they are naturally reflected in and constrain the separation 
rate σ; that is, because of these costs, the value of σ is lowered.  
 Successive positive bt indicates not only that firms fire more workers but that this 
larger than usual job destruction will last for a long period. As a result, the job separation rate 
will stay at a higher level as long as positive bt is successively generated. Hence, the separation 
rate σ is a function of bt such that  tbσσ   and 
   0
t
t
db
bdσ  .                             (32) 
 
Equation (32) implies that separation rate will increase during recessions. 
 In the case of negative bt, the separation rate will decrease because firms will 
maximize the use of existing resources and the number of forced job separations will decrease. 
Hence, inequality (32) also holds for negative bt. Equation (32) therefore also implies that the 
separation rate will decrease during economic booms. 
 Notice, however, that empirical evidence of cyclical fluctuations in the separation rate 
is mixed. Shimer (2005) and Hall (2005b) stated that the separation rate is almost acyclic in the 
United States, but Fujita and Ramey (2009) and Barnichon (2009) argued that the separation 
rate explains no small part of fluctuations in unemployment. 
 
3.2.2  The effect of successive bt on the job-finding rate 
Positive successive bt will also affect the job-finding rate. More specifically, it will decrease the 
rate because the labor market becomes more segmented by space and skill, and mismatch is 
exacerbated when positive bt is generated. 
 
3.2.2.1  Successive bt and mismatch 
Mismatch has long been studied in labor economics (e.g., Kain, 1968; Taylor, 1995; Coles and 
Muthoo, 1998; Hall, 2000; Shimer, 2007), including spatial mismatch (e.g., Ihlanfeldt, 1997; 
Brueckner and Zenou, 2003; Smith and Zenou, 2003) and skill mismatch (e.g., Thisse and 
 26
Zenou, 2000). Shimer (2007) argued that the mismatch factor can explain most of the cyclical 
volatility in the v-u ratio. However, his model is too simplified to be used to explain actual 
phenomena, and it is arguable that mismatch is always economically important because job 
seekers can rationally prepare for the factors that cause mismatch. If a worker can prepare for 
job separation, for example, by collecting information on and studying financial situations of 
firms located even in distant places or by obtaining new skills utilizing a relatively long period 
before the separation, the cost of moving from one possibly segmented labor market to another 
will be dispersed over time before the separation. The costs can be paid in installments in the 
long period before the separation. Thereby, costs per period can be reduced substantially, and 
the hurdle that a worker has to clear to change labor markets will be considerably lowered. 
 If job separations are intentional, for example, to obtain better and more interesting 
jobs with higher wages, workers will sufficiently prepare before deciding to leave their current 
jobs. Even if job separations are forced, workers can prepare if the separations can be 
sufficiently foreseen. More generally, if there is no unexpected disturbance in the economy, 
most workers can sufficiently foresee their own job separations before the separations occur. 
Conversely, mismatch will be economically important if an unexpected large disturbance occurs. 
A large enough upward time preference shock would represent this type of unexpected large 
disturbance and make mismatch an important element. 
 As discussed in Section 3.2.1, many workers are fired owing to positive successive bt, 
but they will not have enough time to prepare for their job separations because these separations 
are not expected sufficiently prior to the actual separation. Without preparation, the costs of 
changing markets are high, and the high costs indicate that the labor market is substantially 
segmented. At the same time, successive bt requires a larger reallocation of workers than usual 
across these substantially segmented labor markets, and mismatch will be exacerbated. In 
addition, because bt is successively generated, the effect of the segmented labor market will last 
for a long period. As a result, mismatch will continue to be economically important while bt is 
generated. 
 
3.2.2.2  The effect on the job-finding rate 
A conventional matching function is  c,te,tt ,vuMm  , where mt is the number of new matches 
in period t. Considering the exacerbated mismatch by positive bt discussed in the previous 
section, the matching function is changed to  tc,te,tt ,b,vuMm ˆ , and more specifically 
 
   c,te,ttt ,vuMbMm ~  ,                         (33) 
 
where  tbM~  is a function of bt. The effect of successive bt indicates that   10~ M  and 
 
  0~ 
t
t
db
bMd  .                            (34) 
 
By incorporating this matching function (equation [33]) into the model in Section 3.1, the 
job-finding rate μφ1-α in equation (25) and the vacancy filled rate μφ-α in equation (27) are 
changed to   αtbμ 1  and   αtbμ  , respectively, and 
   0
t
t
db
bdμ                               (35) 
 
because of equation (34). Equation (35) implies that the job-finding rate will decrease during 
recessions. 
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 In the case of negative bt, μ will increase because firms manage to utilize currently 
existing resources to the greatest possible extent and the number of forced and unprepared job 
separations will decrease, which will result in more moderate mismatch. Hence, inequality (35) 
holds for negative bt. Equation (35) therefore also implies that the job-finding rate will increase 
during economic booms. 
 
3.2.3  The effect of successive bt on vacancy costs 
Vacancy costs κ are the costs that firms are obliged to pay as a result of recruitment activities. 
Vacancy costs therefore include not only the direct costs of recruitment activities (e.g., 
advertising, selection) but obligations engendered by recruitment activities. In particular, 
recruitment obligations include the fact that, after a new worker is hired, the firm is obliged to 
keep employing the worker at least in some periods because many regulations protect workers 
and firms usually cannot freely fire workers arbitrarily at any time. Even without such 
regulations, however, when engaging in recruitment activities a firm is publicly exhibiting its 
intention to continue to employ newly hired workers for some periods. No firm engages in 
recruitment activities if it has the intention of immediately firing the newly hired worker. This 
obligation or intention behind recruitment activities is implicitly but naturally assumed in the 
model presented in Section 3.1. 
 As shown in equation (27), information about κ is used for decision-making in the 
labor market at the time of recruitment. Therefore, if the above-mentioned obligation or 
intention is foreseen to surely cause extra losses or profits in the future, the provision of a 
reserve for these extra losses or profits should be added to the flow cost of vacancy κ because all 
available information should be utilized at the time of decision-making in order to be rational. 
Nevertheless, this obligation or intention usually will do no extra harm or good to firms and will 
not be foreseen to surely cause future extra losses or profits. Hence, κ is usually irrelevant to 
this obligation or intention and therefore is constant. Moreover, it is relatively small because it 
consists mostly of direct costs. 
 However, if bt is generated, κ will no longer be irrelevant to the obligation or intention. 
As shown in Section 2, successively generated bt is eliminated successively, and the elimination 
is implemented by discarding products or preemptively suspending production, leaving some 
capital and labor inputs idle. The number of excess and idle workers has to be reduced, and one 
way to do so is to fire workers as discussed in Section 3.2.1. Another way is to abstain from 
recruiting new workers. Without recruitment, the number of workers a firm employs will 
gradually decrease as some existing workers separate from the firm for various reasons. Because 
firing workers imposes sizable costs on firms from both the financial and management points of 
view, firms will adopt both measures to reduce the number of excess and idle workers. 
 Both of these measures must be correctly reflected in the model. As shown in Section 
3.2.1, the measure of firing excess and idle workers can be directly introduced into the model as 
an increase in the separation rate σ by positive bt. On the other hand, abstaining from recruiting 
workers cannot be directly introduced as a change in the separation or job-finding rates. It 
nevertheless can be reflected in vacancy costs κ because vacancy costs increase owing to 
positive bt as shown below. When positive bt is successively generated, the additional 
production that a newly employed worker contributes to should be eliminated as a part of bt, or 
the new worker should be left idle to preemptively suspend production even though the worker 
is still paid a wage. In either case, the firm will continue to lose money because of the obligation 
or intention to keep employing workers. Unlike the case when bt is not generated, the obligation 
or intention significantly harms firms. These additional costs do not exist unless bt is generated. 
An important point is that these losses are foreseen at the time of recruitment to be surely 
incurred in the future because firms know that the economy is in the state of Nash equilibrium 
of a Pareto inefficient path. Hence, the provision of a reserve for these losses should be added to 
the flow cost of a vacancy. Maintaining an open vacancy while bt is successively generated 
indicates that a firm has made a decision to accept these extra losses in the future, considering 
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the increased cost of the vacancy because of the added reserve provision. 
 In addition, the costs caused by the obligation or intention will be far larger than the 
direct costs for recruitment activities because they include a part of bt. For example, if a newly 
employed worker is left idle, the costs will be equivalent to the total wages w paid to the worker 
during idle periods. If the worker works and the products are immediately discarded, the costs 
become even greater because they amount to π. Therefore, it is clear that a positive bt makes 
recruitment very costly. 
 Hence, when positive bt is generated, vacancy costs κ will substantially increase. As 
long as bt is successively generated, κ will continue to be substantially high. Therefore, vacancy 
costs κ are a function of bt such that  tbκκ   and 
   0
t
t
db
bκd  .                              (36) 
 
Equation (36) implies that the number of vacancies will substantially decrease during recessions 
because the cost of vacancy becomes very high. 
 In the case of negative bt, vacancy costs κ will decrease because extra profits (a part of 
bt) are foreseen to be surely obtained in the future as a result of recruitment activities; thus, 
inequality (36) holds for negative bt. Equation (36) therefore also implies that the number of 
vacancies will increase during economic booms because the cost of a vacancy decreases. Notice, 
however, that the scale of extra profits will be far smaller than that of extra losses because extra 
profits generated by negative bt are the difference between production and wages (i.e., π – w), 
whereas extra losses by positive bt are w or π. A large part of bt leaks to workers in the case of 
negative bt. Notice also that, by equations (27) and (28), a lower κ makes π – w lower, and if κ 
→ 0, then π – w → 0. Thus, extra profits approach zero, which makes κ increase. That is, κ is 
always positive. In addition, a correlation between κ and π or w in the case of positive bt also 
exists. Nevertheless, unlike the correlation with negative bt, that with positive bt only slightly 
affects the scale of the costs caused by the obligation or intention because the costs are not π – w 
that can vary largely but no less than w that is far less variable. Therefore, the correlation with 
positive bt is ignored in this paper for simplicity. 
 
3.2.4  The effect of successive bt on labor productivity 
In the model presented in Section 3.1, capital inputs are implicit and have no explicit effect on 
matching friction. On the other hand, in the model in Section 2, a decrease of capital owing to 
positive successive bt reduces labor productivity because 
  0, 

t
t
k
kAf . This means that even 
though capital inputs are implicit, the effect of bt on capital can be reflected in the model as a 
negative shock on labor productivity π. Hence, labor productivity π is a function of bt such that  tbππ   and 
   0
t
t
db
bdπ  .                             (37) 
 
 Note that the change of labor productivity π as shown in inequality (37) is not a result 
of a change in total factor productivity (TFP). Usually, a change in π is implicitly assumed to 
directly represent that of TFP in studies using search and matching models, but the change in π 
is irrelevant to that of TFP in this paper because conceptually bt cannot affect TFP and thus TFP 
is constant. 
 Note also that, in the case of negative bt, capital inputs will increase because firms 
manage to add extra capital inputs by utilizing currently existing resources to the greatest extent 
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possible; thus, inequality (37) will still hold for negative bt. 
 
3.2.5  The combined effect of successive bt on the v-u ratio 
3.2.5.1  The combined effect 
Equation (31) and inequalities (32) and (35)–(37) indicate that the v-u ratio φ is affected by bt 
through changes in the separation rate, job-finding rate, vacancy costs, and labor productivity 
such that φ is determined by 
  
   
 
 t
t
α
t
t
bκ
zbπββ
bμ
bσr   1                       (38) 
 
for a given value of bt. Let     t
t
t bμ
bσrbΩ   and       t
t
t bκ
zbπβbΞ  1 . By equation (38), 
     ααtt βbΞbΩ   1  .                         (39) 
 
Note that        01 

t
t
t bκ
zbπβbΞ  because naturally   zbπ t  . The total differential of 
equation (39) yields 
 
       






  
t
t
t
tαtα
t b
bΩ
b
bΞβαbΞα
db
d 
 1  .             (40) 
 
Because   0
t
t
db
bdσ  and   0
t
t
db
bdμ , as shown in Sections 3.2.1 and 3.2.2, 
 
         
  01 



  
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
db
bdμ
bμ
bσr
db
bdσbμ
db
bdΩ  .              (41) 
 
In addition, because   0
t
t
db
bκd  and   0
t
t
db
bdπ , as shown in Sections 3.2.3 and 3.2.4, and 
because 10  β  and   0 zbπ t , 
 
 
 
    
 
  01 



 
t
t
t
t
t
t
tt
t
db
bdκ
bκ
zbπ
db
bdπ
bκ
β
db
bdΞ  .              (42) 
 
Therefore, because     01 

  βαbΞα tα   owing to   0tbΞ  and because 
  0
t
t
db
bdΩ  
and   0
t
t
db
bdΞ  by inequalities (41) and (42), then by equation (40), 
 
0
tdb
d  .                              (43) 
 
Hence, when positive successive bt is generated, unemployment increases and/or vacancies 
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decrease even though wages are flexibly adjusted because the matching process is distorted by 
the Nash equilibrium of a Pareto inefficient path. 
 The magnitude of the effect of bt on φ depends on the values of  
t
t
db
bdΩ  and  
t
t
db
bdΞ , 
that is, those of  
t
t
db
bdσ ,  
t
t
db
bdμ ,  
t
t
db
bκd , and  
t
t
db
bdπ , as equations (40)–(42) indicate. The 
larger the values of  
t
t
db
bdσ ,  
t
t
db
bdμ ,  
t
t
db
bκd , and  
t
t
db
bdπ  (i.e., the more σ, μ, π , and κ are 
affected by bt), the more φ decreases. Furthermore, equations (40)–(42) and inequalities (32) 
and (35)–(37) indicate that the four factors (σ, μ, κ, and π) transmit the effect of bt on φ in the 
same direction such that an increase of bt decreases φ and vice versa. 
 
3.2.5.2  Cyclical fluctuations 
The successiveness of bt is an important point. When a positive bt is successively generated, φ 
continues to be low for a long period by inequality (43). Although bt eventually disappears, it 
takes a long time. This persistent or “rigid” nature in the stream of bt indicates that if time 
preference shocks occasionally occur, φ will experience large cyclical fluctuations even if wages 
are flexibly adjusted. 
 
3.2.5.3  Importance of vacancy costs 
Among the four factors (σ, μ, κ, and π), vacancy costs κ are particularly important. The 
proposition that higher prices normally reduce demand is fundamental in economics so it is 
intuitively and logically quite reasonable that firms reduce the number of vacancies because the 
cost of vacancies increases, thereby decreasing the v-u ratio. Compared with vacancy costs, the 
impacts of the separation and job-finding rates on firms’ behaviors toward vacancies are indirect 
and ambiguous. Unless the cost of a vacancy is substantially changed, it seems unlikely that 
firms’ behaviors toward vacancies are considerably affected by these rates. Decreased labor 
productivity may be also attributed to a fewer number of open vacancies, but Shimer (2004, 
2005) and Hall (2005a) argue that a productivity shock alone cannot generate sufficient cyclical 
volatility in the v-u ratio. Therefore, κ has a clear advantage over σ, μ, and π because its change 
naturally and directly affects the number of vacancies. 
 Furthermore, as shown in Section 3.2.3, vacancy costs κ substantially increase because 
of positive bt. If bt is not generated, κ consists mostly of relatively small direct costs for 
recruitment activities, but once a positive bt is generated, κ consists not only of the direct costs 
but also a part of bt, for example, the sum of w or π during the period of obligation. Hence, if 
successive bt is generated, the value of κ will increase noticeably (e.g., several times or more 
than the previous value), and the impact of  
t
t
db
bκd  on 
tdb
d  will be very large. Compared with 
the scale of impact of bt on κ, the impacts on σ, μ, and π appear to be relatively much smaller 
because the observed cyclical variances of σ and αμ 1  are 10–20% and those of π are only 
about several percent. Equations (40)–(42) imply that, if the absolute values of σ, μ, κ, and π 
change at the same rate because of bt, their contributions to 
tdb
d  have roughly the same scale. 
Therefore, the especially high sensitivity of κ to bt suggests that a change in κ makes a relatively 
large contribution to 
tdb
d . 
 These two features of vacancy costs (i.e., κ naturally and directly affects vacancies and 
is extremely increased by bt) imply that substantial changes in κ because of successive bt are the 
main factor driving the large cyclical fluctuations in the v-u ratio. 
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3.3  The Beveridge curve 
Whether unemployment and vacancies are negatively correlated (i.e., whether the Beveridge 
curve is observed) depends on the value of 
tdb
d . By equation (24), ue converges at 
 
αe μσ
σu  1  .                            (44) 
 
When positive successive bt is generated, ue increases because 
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owing to   0
t
t
db
bdσ ,   0
t
t
db
bdμ , and 0
tdb
d  by inequalities (32), (35), and (43). On the 
other hand, the sign of 
t
c
db
dv  is not as simple. By equation (44) and 
e
c
u
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By the total differential of equation (46), 
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Therefore, if 0
1
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e
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σ
dσ  when positive bt is generated, then dvc < 0 and 
thereby ue and vc are negatively correlated because 0
t
e
db
du  by inequality (45). In this case, the 
Beveridge curve (the negative correlation between the unemployment and vacancy rates) will be 
observed. 
 Equation (47) indicates that the direct effect of an increase in σ on vc, 
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1 , is an increase in vc , which is consistent with Shimer’s (2005) arguments. 
In addition, the direct effect of a decrease in μ on vc,   μ
dμ
μu
uσ
α
α
α
e
e

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increased vc. Therefore, the direct effects of σ and μ on vc when positive successive bt is 
generated is an increased vc because   0
t
t
db
bdσ  and   0
t
t
db
bdμ . This result conversely 
 32
implies that the Beveridge curve can be observed only if 
tdb
d  is sufficiently large because 
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1  is necessary for the Beveridge curve by equation (47) and 
t
e
db
du  is inversely proportional to 
tdb
d , as shown in equation (45). In addition, equation (47) 
implies that the shape of the Beveridge curve will shift or become complicated depending on 
how the rate of time preference shifts and what shape the stream of bt takes. 
 Suppose, for example, that 72.0α , 035.0σ , and 45.01 αμ  (see e.g., Shimer, 
2005). Thereby, ue is 0.072 by equation (44). Suppose also that σ increases to 0.038, and μ 
decreases at the rate of 0.03 because the economy fell into a recession. In this case, 
116003.0
035.0
003.0 .μ
dμ
σ
dσ  , and because   798.01
1
1  αue
, if ue increases more than 
14.5% (i.e., from 0.072 to more than 0.083), then dvc < 0 by equation (47). If 
tdb
d  is large 
enough such that 118.01 
tdb
d  (an 11.8% decrease of φ by bt), the condition dvc < 0 is 
satisfied by equation (44). This level of 
tdb
d  will not be difficult to satisfy by the combined 
effects of  
t
t
db
bdσ ,  
t
t
db
bdμ ,  
t
t
db
bκd , and  
t
t
db
bdπ . In particular, the effect of  
t
t
db
bκd  is 
important, as discussed in Section 3.2.5.3. Because  
t
t
db
bκd  is substantially large,  
t
t
db
bκd  will 
make 
tdb
d  sufficiently large and the condition dvc < 0 will be easily satisfied. 
 
4  CYCLICAL FLUCTUATIONS DRIVEN BY 
CHANGES IN TIME PREFERENCE 
 
4.1  The source of rigidity 
Shimer (2004, 2005) and Hall (2005a) showed that, in conventional search and matching 
models with the Nash bargaining wage formation mechanism, the v-u ratio does not change 
substantially because the effect of a productivity change is largely absorbed by flexible wage 
adjustments. This property is a natural consequence of the assumption that disturbances in the 
labor market are smoothly adjusted by wages (and more broadly prices). Unutilized resources 
other than those owing to matching friction are fully exploited by rational agents through 
flexible prices. Because the price mechanism is working, the magnitude of matching friction 
(e.g., the levels of unemployment and vacancies) cannot be substantially affected by 
productivity shocks, and if anything, should be almost constant. This result implies that it is 
unreasonable to think that labor market variables experience large cyclical fluctuations as a 
result of productivity shocks in an economy in which matching friction is the only friction. This 
conjecture has led to the idea that another friction is needed to explain large cyclical fluctuations 
in the labor market. 
 Shimer (2004, 2005) and Hall (2005a) argued that, if a friction in wage dynamics (i.e., 
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wage rigidity) is introduced into search and matching models, the models match well with 
observed data. The cushion of the flexible wage is removed in this case, and the v-u ratio can 
thus be more substantially volatile because wages are not flexible (i.e., the price mechanism 
does not work well) and the impact of productivity shock cannot be sufficiently absorbed. 
However, unlike matching friction, the validity of frictions in price and wage dynamics has not 
necessarily been widely accepted among economists, not a few of whom still regard this as an 
ad hoc assumption, even though voluminous research has been conducted on this subject since 
the era of Keynes (e.g., Fuhrer and Moore, 1995; Galí and Gertler, 1999; Mankiw, 2001). The 
difficulty in presenting a rationale for price (wage) rigidity is easily recognizable. It is very 
difficult to show why rational agents deliberately refrain from changing prices (wages) even 
though they are fully aware they will otherwise lose a great deal of money. 
 In contrast to productivity shocks, time preference shocks can make the v-u ratio 
fluctuate largely and cyclically without introducing the controversial concept of wage rigidity 
because they generate a Nash equilibrium of a Pareto inefficient path (i.e., successive bt). As 
shown previously, successive bt naturally generates the possibility of some variables appearing 
to move rigidly. The stream of bt persists and bt changes gradually, that is, it proceeds rigidly. 
This type of movement makes the economy appear to have a rigid nature, which implies that the 
rigidity in economic fluctuations originally stems from the successive bt, not from the 
long-disputed and still controversial notion of price rigidity. As shown in Section 2, the Nash 
equilibrium of a Pareto inefficient path has a clear microfoundation and thus is not an ad hoc 
assumption. In this sense, the Nash equilibrium of a Pareto inefficient path appears to be 
superior to wage rigidity as an explanation of the source of rigidity. In addition, because time 
preference shocks naturally generate this Nash equilibrium, they appear to be a more likely 
source of cyclical fluctuations that exhibit a rigid nature than productivity shocks. 
 
4.2  Economic importance of time preference shocks 
Time preference shocks are not only reasonable as a mechanism of generating economic 
fluctuations and as a source of rigidity, but they are also economically important. Suppose that 
the production function is the conventional one such that   υttt AkA,kfy  1 . At steady state,   θ
dk
A,kdf
t
t  , and thereby 
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By equation (48), for example, if υ = 0.7 and the rate of time preference θ shifts upward from 
0.04 to 0.06, yt at steady state diminishes by about 16%. Table 2 shows the result of a sensitivity 
analysis, which indicates that a one percentage point upward shift in the time preference rate 
diminishes steady state production by about 10%. 
 A 10% change in GDP is very large compared with the scale of a productivity shock. 
The variance of GDP per capita owing to a productivity shock is at most 2% in most 
industrialized economies. Furthermore, it is well known that the TFP’s variance is very small if 
various cyclical factors that contaminate TFP data are carefully removed (e.g., King and Rebelo, 
1999), which implies that the true variance of GDP per capita owing to a productivity shock is 
even smaller than 2%. Hence, compared with productivity shocks, the impacts of time 
preference shocks appear to be very large and economically quite important. 
 
4.3  Validity of cyclical fluctuations driven by time preference 
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shocks 
The advantage of time preference shock over other shocks as the source of cyclical fluctuations 
can be seen not only in the labor market. Time preference shocks have the following important 
economy-wide properties: 
 
(a) Pareto inefficient paths are rationally chosen. 
(b) Effects of shocks persist. 
(c) Both positive and negative shocks can occur. 
(d) Various scales of economic fluctuations are possible. 
(e) Uncertainty can lead to economic fluctuations. 
(f) Some financial indicators can be used to predict economic fluctuations. 
 
 Property (a) is the most remarkable one. During recessions, large amounts of 
unutilized products and resources are usually and persistently observed, suggesting that the 
economy has fallen into a Pareto inefficient state. However, it is difficult to theoretically show 
the generation mechanism of persistent Pareto inefficiency. This difficulty has made the ad hoc 
assumption of rigidity compelling. However, studies on rigidity have not necessarily come to 
fruition, although voluminous research has been done on this subject. Some economists 
therefore have shifted attention from rigidity to multiple equilibria because these equilibria are 
usually Pareto ranked and include a Pareto inferior equilibrium (e.g., Morris and Shin, 2001). 
However, as argued in Section 1, merely showing the possibility of multiple Pareto-ranked 
equilibria is not sufficient to explain the generation mechanism of persistent Pareto inefficiency. 
In contrast, the Nash equilibrium of a Pareto inefficient path as a consequence of a time 
preference shock naturally generates a persistent Pareto inefficient state. 
 Property (b) covers the main subject in this paper. Section 3 indicates that the factor 
that makes the economy appear to be rigid is derived from successive bt. Rigidity has been 
reported in fluctuations not only in the labor market but in many other markets. Keynesian 
economics has regarded these phenomena as an essential element in economic fluctuations and 
emphasized the importance of price rigidity as the main source of these phenomena. However, it 
is not an easy task to theoretically show the mechanism of price rigidity if rational agents are 
assumed, as is discussed in Section 4.1. In contrast, time preference shocks and successive bt do 
not rely on ad hoc price rigidity to explain the observed nature of rigidity in economic 
fluctuations. Successive bt naturally generates conditions that make the economy appear rigid. 
 Property (c) exhibits a clear advantage of time preference shocks over productivity 
shocks. The explanation of economic fluctuation based on productivity shocks has been 
criticized for having two serious problems. First, as discussed in Section 4.2, the cyclical 
volatility of TFP has been estimated to be very small, particularly if cyclical factors are carefully 
removed from data (e.g., King and Rebelo, 1999). In addition, it is difficult to envision a large 
negative productivity shock because knowledge accumulation is basically irreversible. In 
contrast, both positive and negative time preference shocks can naturally occur.  
 Property (d) is important, particularly as compared to models of multiple equilibria. In 
these models, there are multiple production states (usually two, high and low), and economic 
fluctuations are depicted as a shift between the two states. Consequently, the scale of fluctuation 
is always the same, even though the scales of economic booms and recessions have actually 
varied widely. In contrast, time preference shocks can naturally generate a very wide range 
fluctuation, depending on the size of the increase or decrease in the time preference rate. 
 Properties (e) and (f) answer the important theoretical question of why measures of 
uncertainty and some financial indicators can be used to predict economic fluctuations (see e.g., 
Romer, 1990; Estrella and Mishkin, 1998). If the source of fluctuation is external to people (e.g., 
productivity shocks), people cannot anticipate the events that arise from the shock until it occurs. 
Therefore, in the case of external shocks, uncertainty should not lead to fluctuations. Most 
financial indicators generally should not lead to fluctuations either, because financial indicators 
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primarily move after people anticipate the events. However, time preference shocks are not 
external to people but rather are internal because a time preference, by definition, represents a 
person’s preference. Section 2 shows that time preference shocks can be initiated by a change in 
the level of uncertainty people feel. People first anticipate a shock on their own time preferences, 
and as a result, the economy begins to change. Hence, uncertainty and some financial indicators 
can be naturally used to predict economic fluctuations. Of course, not all fluctuations can be 
predicted by these indicators because some fluctuations will be initiated by external factors, for 
example, an oil price hike or an outbreak of war. 
 Keynes emphasized the importance of “animal spirits” in economic activities (Keynes, 
1936). The concept of animal spirits is vague and various interpretations exist because Keynes 
did not clearly define the term. Nevertheless, proponents of this idea commonly maintain that 
economic activities are largely governed by people’s mood (e.g., optimistic or pessimistic). 
Similarly, the anticipation of uncertainty and time preference rates are internally governed and 
can be a driving force of economic fluctuations as shown in Section 2. Animal spirits as a 
driving force of economic fluctuations may therefore be reinterpreted as people’s changing 
perception of uncertainty and of time preference rates, both of which in turn initiate economic 
fluctuations. 
 
5  CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
The standard search and matching model has been criticized for not having enough power to 
generate sufficiently large cyclical fluctuations in the v-u ratio. One solution to this problem has 
been the introduction of the concept of wage rigidity into the model. However, friction on price 
adjustments has been criticized for its fragile theoretical foundation, and skepticism about its 
economic importance still exists. This paper offers an alternative approach to the explanation of 
the observed large cyclical volatility of the v-u ratio. 
 The paper argues that these large fluctuations can be explained by a mechanism that 
includes a Nash equilibrium of a Pareto inefficient path. Such a Nash equilibrium exists because 
households are risk averse and non-cooperative. On this Pareto inefficient path, unutilized 
products and resources are persistently generated. A Nash equilibrium of a Pareto inefficient 
path is generated even in a frictionless economy if, and probably only if, the rate of time 
preference shifts. The situation can be described by a non-cooperative mixed strategy game in 
which a strategy profile consisting of strategies of choosing a Pareto inefficient transition path 
of consumption is a Nash equilibrium. 
 When a Nash equilibrium of a Pareto inefficient path is generated after a time 
preference shock, the economy appears to be rigid. The Nash equilibrium distorts the matching 
process, and by affecting various factors in the labor market, sufficiently large and cyclical 
fluctuations in the v-u ratio occur because the Nash equilibrium successively or “rigidly” 
generates Pareto inefficiency. Among the affected factors, vacancy costs are particularly 
important, which is intuitively and logically reasonable because firms should reduce the number 
of vacancies as the cost of vacancies increase and vice versa. Because of the gradual or “rigid” 
movement on this Pareto inefficient path, the v-u ratio can fluctuate largely and cyclically if 
time preference shocks occur. 
 The advantages of time preference shocks as an explanation for economic fluctuations 
can be seen not only in the labor market but in many other markets as well because Pareto 
inefficient paths are rationally chosen, the effects of shocks persist, both positive and negative 
shocks can occur, various scales of fluctuations can occur, and uncertainty can lead to economic 
fluctuations. 
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Figure 2: The paths of Jalone and NJalone 
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Figure 3: A Pareto inefficient transition path 
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Figure 4: Endogenous time preference 
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Figure 5: Permanently constant time preference 
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Table 1  The payoff matrix 
 
              Any other household 
  J  NJ  
A
 h
ou
se
ho
ld
       
J  E0(Jtogether), E0(Jtogether) E0(Jalone), E0(NJtogether) 
      
NJ  E0(NJalone), E0(Jtogether) E0(NJtogether), E0(NJtogether)
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2  The impact of time preference shocks on production 
 
Time preference rate  
Change of steady state production (%)
Initial After shock 
0.03 0.04 –11.6 
0.04 0.05 –9.1 
0.05 0.06 –7.5 
  
0.03 0.05 –19.7 
0.04 0.06 –16.0 
0.05 0.07 –13.4 
  
0.03 0.06 –25.7 
0.04 0.07 –21.3 
0.05 0.08 –18.2 
 
 
 
